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Turkey and the Caucasus
Turkey has had long-standing links with the region called the ‘South(ern) Caucasus’, comprised of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, including the de-facto independent 
entities of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The area was, for a long time, the 
scene of intense competition between the Persian-Sassanid and Ottoman Empires, before its 
gradual incorporation into the Russian Empire during the fi rst half of the 19th century. Since 
the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Turkey has become a major regional player through direct 
investments, and the trade and transportation links tying the Caspian basin to the outside 
world over Georgia in circumvention of Russian territory, most important among them the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. But the weight of both history and ethnic kinship 
has distorted the operation of material interests, even under Ankara’s new, zero-problems 
foreign policy. The historical legacies of massacre and confl ict during and after World War One 
continue to weigh down on relations between Turkey and Armenia, and the close political 
interaction between Ankara and Baku – encapsulated in the slogan ‘One nation, two states’ 
– remains a major ethno-political factor shaping the regional environment.
TURKEY, THE SOUTH CAUCASUS, AND THE RUSSIA FACTOR 
Turkey’s role in the South Caucasus cannot be analysed separately from its broader relationship with the 
Russian Federation – which has seen a considerable evolution since the early years following the Cold 
War, when some offi cials in Moscow and Turkey traded threats during Armenian military advances in 
the region in May 1992. Initially, many analysts and policymakers in the West assumed Turkey would 
quickly fi ll the perceived strategic vacuum left by Moscow in the former Soviet states of the South 
Caucasus and Central Asia. By the second half of the 1990s, these hopes largely subsided, as most 
dictatorships of the region either went into isolation (as in the case of Turkmenistan), or largely re-
aligned with Moscow. Meanwhile, the Turkish economic crisis of 2001 caused Ankara to concentrate 
its efforts at improving its economy during the fi rst years of this century, rather than expanding its 
political infl uence abroad. This led to renewed efforts aimed at joining the EU, alongside a drive to 
expand economic relations with the former Soviet Union and, specifi cally, the Russian Federation.
By the end of the 1990s, relations between Turkey and Russia had begun to improve. With the war in 
Chechnya no longer affecting Turkish domestic sensibilities, and the BTC-pipeline a fait accompli, the 
focus shifted from competition over energy routes – with Turkey as the major pathway preferred by 
the West – to the benefi ts of increased bilateral trade. Turkish conglomerates became major players 
in the Russian construction sector; and the completion of the Blue Stream pipeline across the Black 
Sea in 2003 turned Gazprom into Turkey’s main supplier of natural gas, making Russia the country’s 
largest trading partner by 2008. Ankara had also become more deferential towards Russia’s regional 
geo-strategic interests – a deference that increased in parallel with an enhanced independence from the 
West with the advent of the AKP government in 2003. Slighted by the EU in its European aspirations 
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and irritated by US policies in (northern) Iraq, Ankara 
aimed to maximise its alternatives, including within 
the former Soviet Union. These developments also 
coincided with the shift in Turkish foreign policy 
from the realist isolationism and explicit Western 
orientation of orthodox Kemalism, to the more 
activist, ‘zero-problems’ policies encapsulated in 
the term ‘Strategic Depth’ – an active engagement 
with the outside world aimed at maximising the policy 
options available to Turkey, centred on the former 
Ottoman territories and borderlands in the Caucasus, 
the Middle East and the Balkans. 
Within the Caucasus (and, more generally, the 
former Soviet Union), the ‘strategic depth’ approach 
incorporates a general concern by Ankara to maintain 
the existing status quo, as well as to avoid offending 
Russian sensibilities. Turkey has generally taken a 
dim view of major upheavals in its neighbourhood 
– including the colour revolutions in the Ukraine 
and Georgia – and was genuinely alarmed during 
the 2008 August war, which brought home in 
stark relief its diffi cult position between East and 
West. Concerned at being excluded from major 
political developments in the region that may affect 
its economic interest in maintaining its position as 
an energy and transportation hub, and aiming to 
continue an engagement with, in particular, Russia, 
Erdogan resurrected an idea – earlier proposed by 
his predecessor, Süleyman Demirel – of a Caucasus 
Peace and Stability Platform ‘without the participation 
of extra-regional powers’. Touted as a forum aimed 
at promoting regional peace, cooperation and 
economic development, it was meant to include 
Turkey, Russia, and the three Southern Caucasian 
states, but pointedly excluded Western powers, fi tting 
well into the multi-dimensional and increasingly 
independent nature of Turkey’s policy of ‘strategic 
depth’.
TURKEY AND THE THREE SOUTHERN CAUCASIAN 
STATES: BETWEEN FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION 
AND HOSTILITY
Ankara’s bilateral relationships with the three South 
Caucasian states have combined promotion of the 
national interest with a prudent deference for Russia’s 
core regional concerns. In short, Turkey maintains 
close co-operation with Georgia, mainly centred on 
economic matters, but refrains from taking sides 
in Tbilisi’s troubled relationship with Moscow. Its 
relationship with Armenia is deeply problematic – 
in the absence of formal diplomatic links between 
the two capitals, the border between these two 
states remains fi rmly shut to bilateral trade and 
travel. By contrast, Ankara’s ties with Baku have 
consistently remained extremely close; Baku sees 
its larger Turkic neighbour as a natural strategic 
partner, something Russia does not object to provided 
its military-strategic prerogatives are not directly 
challenged. In the southern Caucasus, Turkey’s ‘zero-
problems’ approach seems to be circumscribed by 
Russia’s volatile relationship with Georgia, and the 
intractability of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, two issues over 
which Ankara has little direct infl uence.
TURKEY AND GEORGIA
Turkey has had to tread carefully in its relationship 
with Georgia, the most pro-Western of the South 
Caucasian states. While Tbilisi’s westwards lurch 
began well before the Rose Revolution-proper, the 
rise to power of the vocally anti-Russian Saakashvili 
presented Turkey with the problem of how to balance 
its formal alliance with the United States with its 
prudent policies vis-à-vis its trading partner Russia. 
Any participation by Ankara in the Train and Equip 
Programmes designed to upgrade Georgia’s military 
infrastructure to NATO standards was, accordingly, 
lukewarm and piecemeal – largely limited to the 
upgrading and reconstruction of Georgian military 
bases and the sale of light military materiel. In addition, 
Turkey’s broader strategy of expanding its position 
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as an energy and transportation hub situated at the 
crossroads between Europe and Central Asia created 
a common interest with Tbilisi in routing energy and 
transportation links from the Caspian over Georgian 
(and subsequently Turkish) territory. While the BTC 
pipeline is now operational, proposed infrastructure 
projects including the Nabucco gas pipeline clearly 
put Turkey and Georgia on the opposing side of a 
geopolitical argument with Moscow.
 
Ankara’s close economic relations with Tbilisi are also 
potentially complicated by the presence of a large and 
active North Caucasian diaspora within the country. 
The related Circassian and Abkhaz communities 
were active in breaking the trade embargo against 
the breakaway region well before the August war of 
2008, and these economic links have increased since 
their recognition by Moscow that year, adding to the 
possibility of friction with Georgia notwithstanding 
the presence of overarching shared strategic interests. 
It is precisely this precarious position between two 
hostile sides – Russia and the separatists on the one 
hand, and Georgia and its Western partners on the 
other – that drives Ankara’s desire to avoid having 
to take sides, resulting in initiatives like the Caucasus 
Peace and Stability Platform and a continuing, delicate 
diplomatic balancing act.
TURKEY AND ARMENIA
Turkey’s most unambiguously problematic relationship 
in the Southern Caucasus is with the Republic of 
Armenia – weighed down by both history, and the 
tight ethno-cultural links between Ankara and Baku. 
While both sides recognise each other, they have no 
diplomatic relations; their land border has remained 
closed since April 1993, in reaction to Armenian 
military advances in Azerbaijan. Turkish policymakers 
– including those of the AKP – have since formulated 
three basic conditions for the establishment of formal 
links and the opening of the land border: fi rst, 
an explicit recognition of the current land border 
delineated by the treaties of Moscow and Kars by 
Yerevan; second, an end to Armenia’s efforts to 
have the 1915 massacres of the Ottoman Armenian 
minority internationally recognised as genocide; and 
third, withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azeri 
territories. Armenia, on the other hand, has insisted 
on diplomatic relations and open borders ‘without 
preconditions’. 
The events of August 2008 gave renewed impetus to 
efforts by both governments to set aside their deep-
seated differences, in a hitherto frustrated attempt 
to do away with one of Ankara’s major obstacles 
towards a ‘zero problems’ Southern Caucasus. On the 
one hand, Turkey was reminded of the geopolitical 
vulnerability of its links to Central Asia through 
Georgian territory. On the other hand, Armenia 
was made painfully aware of its dependence on 
Georgian transit routes for 70% of its trade with the 
outside world. In what came to be called ‘football 
diplomacy’, president Sargsyan of Armenia invited 
his Turkish counterpart to the world cup qualifying 
match between the two countries in Yerevan in 
September that year – the fi rst visit ever by a Turkish 
head of state to the Armenian capital. Abdullah Gul 
reciprocated two months later by inviting Sargsyan 
for the return match in the Turkish city of Sivas. 
The invitations were the result of several years of 
behind-the-scenes negotiations between the two 
sides, under Swiss mediation and with the strong 
encouragement of both Russia and the United States. 
In April 2009, the process culminated in the signing 
of protocols between the two governments: Armenia 
recognised the current border, an intergovernmental 
commission would tackle all outstanding issues 
(including historical ones) between the two states, 
while the Nagorno-Karabakh problem was left outside 
the formal scope of the normalisation process.
Turkey had multiple motives in moving towards 
normalisation with Armenia. On a general level, 
they fi t into the ‘zero-problems’ policy formulated by 
AKP policymakers, whereby outstanding issues with 
all neighbours are to be addressed pro-actively. Several 
more specifi c reasons for the move have also been 
suggested, including the possible use of Armenia 
as an alternative to Georgia as a transit route for 
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energy and transportation; averting recognition of 
the 1915 massacres as genocide by US Congress on 
the eve of their 100th anniversary; and mitigating 
Armenia’s stance in the Karabakh confl ict through 
growing economic interdependence and civil-society 
interaction with Turkey. Crucially, Moscow – confi dent 
in its strategic dominance over Armenia’s economy – 
seemed to approve of the rapprochement. 
Now, nearly two years later, the process seems to 
have at best, stalled, or at worst resulted in complete 
failure, despite the overwhelming support from the 
international community. Under domestic pressure 
and in reaction to Azerbaijan’s vehement opposition, 
Ankara has linked any ratifi cation of the protocols 
by its parliament to ‘progress’ in the negotiations 
surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. Yerevan’s reaction 
has been to suspend its formal approval of the 
documents, on condition of their renewed de-
coupling by Turkey from its confl ict with Baku. As 
things stand, the improvement of bilateral Turkish-
Armenian relations seems once again dependent on 
a fi nal breakthrough in the OSCE-led negotiations 
surrounding the breakaway territory, or a volte-face 
by Ankara, both of which seem unlikely at this point. 
TURKEY AND AZERBAIJAN
Relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan are 
extremely close, although they do sometimes fail 
to live up to the oft-utilised slogan ‘one nation, two 
states’ – as during recent diplomatic spats over the 
pricing of gas supplies and efforts at Armenian-
Turkish rapprochement. Ethno-linguistically, among 
former Soviet Turkic ethnic groups, Azeris relate 
most closely to the Anatolian Turks – the languages 
are largely mutually intelligible, and, with both 
societies largely secularised, the religious difference 
between the largely Shi’ite Azeris and Sunni Turks 
has become irrelevant. The large Azeri diaspora in 
Turkey adds to the inter-human links between the 
two societies, apart from acting as a foreign policy 
lobby in its own right on occasion. During the fi rst 
years of independence – and, in particular, the ill-
fated presidency of the late Abufaz Elchibey of the 
Azeri Popular Front – Azerbaijan’s foreign policy was 
based on an explicit adherence to the principles of 
pan-Turkism (the idea that ethnic Turkic peoples 
throughout the Eurasian landmass would have to 
unite politically), and a corresponding vehemently 
anti-Russian and pro-Turkish/Western stance. Since 
the advent to power of the Aliyevs, Baku has taken 
care to pursue a ‘balanced and independent’ foreign 
policy, one that aims to walk a tightrope between 
maintaining its independence and not provoking 
the geopolitical sensitivities of its large northern 
neighbour, which did not refrain from intervening 
extensively in domestic Azeri politics in the fi rst, 
chaotic years of its independence. 
Both countries are closely tied economically as well: 
beyond Georgia, Turkey is the main conduit for 
Azerbaijan’s oil exports – through the BTC pipeline 
– and, potentially, gas exports (through the proposed 
Nabucco pipeline). Last but not least, military co-
operation between Baku and Ankara started in the 
fi rst years of the former’s independence, with much 
of the Azeri offi cer corps receiving extensive training 
in Turkey; it has currently been expanded through a 
defence pact providing for mutual military assistance 
by either side in the event of an attack by a third 
party, the joint production of weaponry, deepened 
military co-operation through joint training and 
exercise programmes, and logistical co-operation. 
While this was the fi rst time Azerbaijan formalised 
such close military-strategic co-operation with a 
NATO member, it does remain unlikely that Turkey 
would actually infringe on Russia’s strategic space by 
directly intervening in a renewed confl ict between 
Azerbaijan and CSTO member Armenia, or building 
bases on Azeri territory. This implicit understanding 
seems to underwrite Russia’s hitherto restrained 
reaction to the deal.
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE
Turkey’s position in the Southern Caucasus has been 
dependent on a number of factors: a balancing of 
its NATO commitments with its excellent economic 
(and increasingly, political) relationship with the 
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Russian Federation; its shared interest with Georgia 
in positioning itself as a transit hub for hydrocarbons 
from the Caspian basin; its ethnic kinship with 
Azerbaijan and the ensuing domestic pressure to 
support Baku in its confl ict with Yerevan; and its 
historically fraught relationship with Armenia. In 
terms of the ‘strategic depth’ doctrine, the major 
initiatives undertaken by the AKP government since 
2003 aimed at creating a zone of ‘zero problems’ in 
that particular section of Turkey’s neighbourhood have 
not resulted in major changes in the region’s strategic 
landscape. In contrast to recent developments in the 
Middle East, Turkey’s priorities and alignments within 
the South Caucasus remain relatively unchanged – 
and any progress over the past decade has been, at 
most, incremental. The Caucasus Peace and Stability 
Platform has come to naught – in no small part 
due to Ankara and Yerevan’s failure to come to an 
understanding on the many issues still dividing them: 
fi rst among them, the Nagorno-Karabakh confl ict.
Along with renewed hostilities between Russia and 
Georgia, this confl ict poses perhaps the greatest 
challenge to Turkey’s policies in the region. In the  
 absence of a fi nal peace agreement, renewed 
warfare between Armenia and Azerbaijan remains 
a distinct possibility in coming years. Ankara would 
have to make diffi cult decisions in such an eventuality, 
making its regional balancing act vis-à-vis Russia 
even more diffi cult than it is today. Turkey’s lack 
of direct infl uence over the peace process itself 
(it remains outside the OSCE troika carrying out 
formal negotiations between the parties) is proving 
increasingly frustrating to its policymakers. In the 
Southern Caucasus at least, Turkey’s historical and 
religious-ethnic ties have at best proven a mixed 
blessing in terms of contemporary policymaking. ■
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